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Slopey Quantizers Are Locally Optimal for Witsenhausen’s Counterexample
Amir Ajorlou† and Ali Jadbabaie†
Abstract— We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a
leader-follower game of incomplete information. The follower
makes a noisy observation of the leader’s action (who moves
first) and chooses an action minimizing her expected deviation
from the leader’s action. Knowing this, leader who observes
the realization of the state, chooses an action that minimizes
her distance to the state of the world and the ex-ante expected
deviation from the follower’s action. We show the existence of
what we call “near piecewise-linear equilibria” when there is
strong complementarity between the leader and the follower
and the precision of the prior is poor. As a major consequence
of this result, we prove local optimality of a class of slopey
quantization strategies which had been suspected of being the
optimal solution in the past, based on numerical evidence for
Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
Index Terms— Decentralized control, optimal stochastic con-
trol, incomplete information games, perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work [1], Witsenhausen constructed a sim-
ple two-stage linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) decentralized
control problem where the optimal controller happens to be
nonlinear. This example showed for the first time that linear
quadratic Gaussian team problems can have nonlinear so-
lutions. By resorting to Witsenhausen’s counterexample, [2]
produced an example showing that the standard decentralized
static output optimal control problem of linear deterministic
systems could also admit optimal nonlinear solutions. For
nearly half a century, this counterexample has been a subject
of intense research across multiple communities ( [3]–[8]).
The endogenous information structure of Witsenhausen’s
counterexample, where the signal observed in the second
stage is a noisy version of the control action in the first
stage, gives rise to a nonclassical information structure.
While the problem looks deceptively simple and quadratic
on first look, it is actually a very complicated, nonconvex,
functional optimization problem. This counterexample has
shed light on intricacies of optimal decisions in stochastic
team optimization problems with similar information struc-
ture. Naturally, this problem has given rise to a large body
of literature. For example, [9] provides a variant of Wit-
senhausen’s counterexample with discrete primitive random
variables and finite support, where no optimal solution exists.
Another interesting variant, with the same information struc-
ture but different cost function, is the Gaussian test channel
( [4], [10]) where the linear strategies can be shown to be
optimal. Also, [11] shows that if the objective function is
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changed to a worst case induced norm, the linear controllers
dominate nonlinear policies. While [1] proves the existence
of an optimal solution using tools from real and functional
analysis, other works such as ( [6], [8]) suggest lifting the
problem to an equivalent optimization problem over the
space of probability measures and then employing tools from
the optimal transport theory [12].
Although the optimal strategy and optimal cost for Wit-
senhausen’s counterexample are still unknown, it can be
shown that carefully designed nonlinear strategies can largely
outperform the linear strategies (see, e.g., the multi-point
quantization strategies proposed by [5]). This result, in
particular, implies the fragility of the comparative statics
and policies solely derived based on the linear strategies in
problems with similar setting. A relevant line of research is
to provide error bounds on the proximity to optimality for
approximate solutions. [13]–[15] use information theoretic
techniques and vector versions of the original problem to
provide such bounds. There are also several works aiming to
approximate the optimal solution. [16]–[19] employ different
heuristic approaches, all confirming an almost piecewise-
linear form for the optimal controller. However, a complete
optimality proof for such strategies has been elusive.
In this paper, we view Witsenhausen’s problem as a
leader-follower coordination game in which the action of the
leader is corrupted by an additive noise, before reaching the
follower. The leader aims to coordinate with the follower
while staying close to the observed state, recognizing that
her action is not observed perfectly. As a result, she needs
to signal the follower in a manner that can be decoded
efficiently. More than a mere academic counterexample, the
above setup could model a scenario where coordination
happens across generations and the insights of the leader
who is from a different generation is corrupted/lost by the
time the message reaches the future generations. If the leader
can internalize the fact that her actions will not be observed
perfectly, how should she act to make sure coordination
occur? When the leader cares far more about coordination
with the follower than staying “on the message”, the near
piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy of the leader coarsens
the observation in well-spaced intervals, rather than merely
broadcasting a linearly scaled version of the observed state as
the linear strategy would suggest. In this line, we prove the
existence of a superior equilibrium strategy which coarsens
the message via a “slopey quantizer”, making both the leader
and follower better off compared to the linear equilibrium
strategies.
To this end, we analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibria
of this game and show that strong complimentarily between
the leader and the follower combined with a prior with poor
enough precision can give rise to nonlinear equilibria, and
in particular, equilibria in form of slopey quantizers. To the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first providing an
analytical rationale for the optimality of slopey quantization
strategies for Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
The main idea behind the proof is to carefully construct a
class of what we call near piecewise-linear strategies for the
leader that stays invariant under the best response operator.
By a near piecewise-linear strategy, we mean a piecewise
strategy where the changes in the derivative in each segment
are very small, making the strategy in each segment almost
linear. Each strategy has a fixed number of segments, with
leader’s action changing very slowly within each segment. As
a result, leader’s actions stay very close to fixed points of the
strategy in each segment. These fixed points are the values
of the state which the leader does not distort. Therefore,
well-spaced fixed points (combined with some appropriate
bounds on the relative prior of the state of the world in
different segments) reveal the leader’s actions to the follower
with high probability, making the “signal” easily decodable.
As a consequence, we can characterize the best response of
the follower to leader’s strategy. Using this characterization,
we show that the best response of the leader to follower’s
strategy also varies very little, essentially remaining near
piecewise-linear as well.
A key challenge in deriving the invariance property for
this set of strategies for the leader is to bound and control
the displacement in the fixed points and endpoints of the
segments of leader’s strategy under the best response. A key
observation here is that the fixed points of the leader’s best
responses are local minimizers of the expected deviation of
the leader’s action from the follower. This insight allows us
to show that the fixed points of the leader’s best response lie
in a tight neighborhood of the fixed points of the follower’s
strategy. We then show that the fixed points of the follower’s
strategy in turn lie in a vicinity of a convex combination of
the leader’s fixed points and the expected value of the state
of the world within each segment. Combining the two, we
can derive an approximate dynamics for the displacement in
the fixed points and endpoints of the segments in leader’s
strategy under the best response. Using this approximate
dynamics, we then characterize an invariant set of fixed
points and interval endpoints for leader’s strategy, which
we can then use in order to prove the existence of a near
piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy for the leader.
II. MODEL
The game consists of a leader L and a follower F . Before
the agents act, the state of the world θ is drawn from a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2. The leader can
observe the realization of θ and acts first. The payoff of the
leader is given as
uL = −rL(θ − aL)
2 − (1− rL)(aF − aL)
2, (1)
where aF is the action of the follower and 0 < rL < 1. The
follower makes a private, noisy observation of the leader’s
action, s = aL + δ where δ ∼ N(0, 1). The payoff of the
follower is
uF = −(aL − aF )
2. (2)
We consider the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game
and show that they reduce to the Bayes Nash equilibria due
to the Gaussian noise in the observation. Denote with a∗L(θ)
and a∗F (s) the equilibrium strategies, and with ν∗(·|s) the
follower’s belief about leader’s action given s. Due to the
normal noise in the observation, ν∗(·|s) is fully determined
by a∗L(θ) and the prior as there are no off-equilibrium-path
information sets. Equilibrium strategies should thus satisfy
a∗F (s) =Eν∗ [a
∗
L|s] =
∫ ∞
−∞
aLν
∗(aL|s)daL,
a∗L(θ) = argmax
aL
−rL(θ − aL)
2
− (1− rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
(a∗F (s)− aL)
2φ(s− aL)ds, (3)
where φ(·) denotes the PDF of the standard normal distribu-
tion. We can easily characterize the linear equilibria of the
game, following [1].
Theorem 1: Linear Bayes strategies of the leader and
follower are of the form a∗F (s) = µs and a∗L(θ) = λθ, where
µ = t
2
1+t2 and λ =
t
σ
, and t is a real root of the equation
rL
1− rL
(σ − t) =
t
(1 + t2)2
.1 (4)
Our main objective in this paper is to show the existence of
an equilibrium with a near piecewise-linear strategy for the
leader in the regime where there is strong complementarity
between the leader and the follower (when rL is small) and
the prior’s precision is poor (or large σ). To this end, and
motivated mainly by [1], we focus on regime 1
σ
≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1,
and aim to prove the existence of such an equilibrium for
sufficiently large values of σ (and hence small rL).
III. NONLINEAR EQUILIBRIA
Our approach for proving the existence of an equilibrium
with a near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader is to
identify a set of such strategies for the leader that is invariant
under the best response operator. We characterize such a set
in the next section.
A. An Invariant Set of Near Piecewise-Linear Strategies for
the Leader
Given m ∈ N, consider a partition of the normal dis-
tribution N(0, σ2) into 2m + 1 segments ∪mk=−mB0k, with
B0k = [b
0
k, b
0
k+1) for k ∈ Nm, B00 = (b0−1, b01), and B0−k =
(b0−k−1, b
0
−k], with b0−k = −b0k and b0m+1 = −b0−m−1 =
+∞. Denote with c0k the expected value of θ ∼ N(0, σ2)
in segment B0k, that is, c0k = EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ B0k]. Clearly,
c00 = 0 and c0−k = −c0k for k ∈ Nm.
We are in particular interested in a partition where the
interval endpoints b0k are the midpoints of [c0k−1, c0k], i.e.,
1Proofs are not included in this manuscript due to space limitations. See
[20] for the proofs.
b0k =
c0
k−1+c
0
k
2 for k ∈ Nm. We can show that such a partition
exists and is unique. Next, we construct a set of (2m+ 1)-
segmented increasing odd functions, denoted by AmL (rL, σ)
satisfying the following properties.
Property 1: For every aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ), there ex-
ist 2m + 1 segments Bk = [bk, bk+1), for k ∈ Nm,
B0 = (−b1, b1), and B−k = (b−k−1, b−k], with bm+1 =
−b−m−1 = +∞ such that:
• aL(θ) is increasing and odd (i.e., aL(−θ) = −aL(θ)),
and is smooth over each interval.
• aL(θ) has a unique fixed point in each segment. That
is, for each interval Bk, (−m ≤ k ≤ m), there exists a
unique ck ∈ Bk such that aL(ck) = ck, with c0 = 0.
We also impose a constraint on the slope of aL(θ) in each
interval, keeping the slope very close to rL, as well as a linear
bound on aL(θ) in the tail. More precisely, we impose the
following property:
Property 2: For every −m < k < m and θ ∈ Bk,
¯
r ≤
d
dθ
aL(θ) ≤ r¯, where
¯
r = rL(1 − 0.5r
2
Lσ
2) and r¯ = rL(1 +
2.5r2Lσ
2). For the tail interval Bm,
¯
r ≤ d
dθ
aL(θ) ≤ r¯ for
bm < θ < cm + σ
2
. For θ > cm + σ2 we have aL(θ) ≤
cm + 5rL(θ − cm + σ).
2
The larger σ, the closer r¯ and
¯
r to rL. For instance, choosing
σ ≥ 16 ensures r¯ < 1.01rL and
¯
r > 0.998rL. Finally, we
impose the constraint that interval endpoints bk remain close
to midpoints of [ck−1, ck] and that fixed points ck remain
close to c0k’s.
Property 3: For every k ∈ Nm,
|bk −
ck−1 + ck
2
| ≤ 0.1rLσ. (5)
Moreover,
|ck − c
0
k| ≤
2k(2m− k)ζ
rL
, (6)
where ζ = 0.44r2Lσ2 + (2m+ 3.4)r2Lσ.
Our proof strategy is then to show that for any m ∈ N,
there exists σm > 0 such that, for every σ ≥ σm in regime
1
σ
≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1, the set of strategies AmL (rL, σ) characterized
by Property 1-3 is invariant under the best response operator.
B. Best Response Analysis
The first step in verifying the invariance of AmL (rL, σ)
is to characterize the best response of the follower aF (s)
to the leader’s strategy aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ). We can then
use these properties to find the updated best response of the
leader to aF (s), denoted by a˜(θ) and enforce its inclusion
in AmL (rL, σ). Choosing σ sufficiently large, we can ensure
several useful properties for AmL (rL, σ) that can facilitate this
process. We state these properties in the lemma below.
Lemma 1: There exists σm ≥ max(16, 7m2) such that
for any σ ≥ σm in regime 1σ ≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1 we have the
following:
• The lengths of the half intervals in any strategy aL(θ) ∈
AmL (rL, σ) are upper-bounded by σ. That is, |ck−1 −
bk| ≤ σ and |ck − bk| ≤ σ for k ∈ Nm.
2We only state the properties (and in many cases the analysis) only for
θ ≥ 0. The counterpart for θ ≤ 0 is immediate since the function is odd.
• There exists a C > 3 lnσ such that the lengths of the
half intervals in any strategy aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ) are
lower-bounded by C. That is, |ck−1 − bk| ≥ C and
|ck − bk| ≥ C for k ∈ Nm. Moreover, cm ≥ σ and
bm ≥ 0.5σ.
• The lengths of the first half (second half) of the intervals
in any strategy aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ) are in increasing
order. That is, |ck − bk| < |ck+1 − bk+1| and |ck−1 −
bk| < |ck − bk+1|, for k ∈ Nm−1. Moreover, b2 − b1 >
2b1 ensuring an increasing order on the lengths of the
intervals as well.
• Let ek, 0 ≤ k ≤ m, be the expected value of θ in
segment Bk, i.e., ek = EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bk]. Then, the
distances from ek to the endpoints bk and bk+1 also
satisfies the lower and upper boundsC and σ. Moreover,
em ≥ 0.5σ.
By choosing σ ≥ σm, we can exploit the properties stated
for AmL (rL, σ) in the above lemma. In what follows, we
use these properties to prove the invariance of the set of
strategies AmL (rL, σ) under the best response. The follower’s
best response to the strategy of the leader aL(θ) is the
expected action of the leader given the observation s = aL+δ
and can be written as
aF (s) = Eδ[aL|s] =
∫∞
−∞ aL(θ)φ(s − aL(θ))φ(
θ
σ
)dθ∫∞
−∞ φ(s− aL(θ))φ(
θ
σ
)dθ
. (7)
Using this, we can easily show that aF (s) is analytic and
increasing, with d
ds
aF (s) = Var[aL|s] (see [1] for a proof).
In order to characterize aF (s), we start by estimating the
expected action of the leader and its variance conditioned
on the interval to which θ belongs. Actions of the leader in
interval Bk (k 6= ±m) are well-concentrated around ck. In
fact |aL(θ) − ck| ≤ r¯σ for θ ∈ Bk, from which the lemma
below immediately follows.
Lemma 2: For 0 ≤ k < m, |E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk] − ck| ≤
r¯σ and Var[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bk] ≤ r¯2σ2.
The analysis is a bit involved in the tail, since for θ >
cm the leader’s actions are not in a bounded vicinity of cm
anymore. However, we can derive several useful properties
for the tail as well.
Lemma 3: Consider a tail observation by the leader (i.e.,
θ ∈ Bm). Then,
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm ≤ r¯σ, (8)
for s ≤ cm + σ, and
E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm ≤ 5rLσ(s− cm+1+
0.01
σ2
), (9)
for s > cm+ σ. Also, E[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]− cm ≥ −r¯σ. As
for the variance,
Var[aL(θ)|s, θ ∈ Bm]≤


1
3 , for s < cm−1
0.64r¯2σ2, for cm−1 ≤ s ≤ cm + σ
8.8r2Lσ
2(s− cm)
2, for s > cm + σ.
(10)
Let the signal observed by the follower be between ck and
ck+1, i.e., s = ck+δ with 0 ≤ δ ≤ ck+1−ck. Then, we claim
that the follower’s posterior on θ given s has a negligible
probability out of the neighboring intervals Bk ∪Bk+1. We
first derive the following property for the relative prior of θ
in Bk’s by relating it to ek’s and using the bounds on the
distance from ek to the endpoints of the intervals, as well as
the increasing order of the lengths of the intervals given by
Lemma 1.
Lemma 4: For any −m ≤ k1, k2 ≤ m, we have
Prob[θ ∈ Bk1 ]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk2 ]
≤ e
(c
k2
−c
k1
)2
64 . (11)
This lemma implies that the posterior on θ is more affected
by the likelihoods rather than relative priors. Using this, we
can bound the posterior of θ outside the neighboring intervals
to s (i.e., out of Bk ∪Bk+1).
Lemma 5: Let the observed signal by the follower be s =
ck + δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ ck+1 − ck. Then, for any r ≥ 1,
Prob[θ ∈ Bk−r|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s]
≤ e−
245(c
k
−c
k−r
)2
512 . (12)
Similarly,
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+r+1|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1|s]
≤ e−
245(c
k+r+1−ck+1)
2
512 . (13)
Using this lemma and the fact that the fixed points ck
are well-spaced, we can show that the effect of the intervals
other than Bk and Bk+1 on aF (s) are negligible. In order
to characterize the follower’s best response aF (s), we then
need to focus only on the segments adjacent to the observed
signal, and in particular figure out the weight of each of
these two neighboring intervals in the follower’s posterior
on θ. We do this in the following lemma.
Lemma 6: Define
mk+1 =
ck + ck+1
2
+
1
∆k+1
ln
(
Prob[θ ∈ Bk]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1]
)
, (14)
where ∆k+1 = ck+1 − ck. Also, write the signal observed
by the follower as s = mk+1+ δ. Then, for 0 ≤ k < m− 1,
e−∆k+1(δ+r¯σ)−
r¯
2
σ
2
2 ≤
Prob[θ ∈ Bk|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bk+1|s]
≤e−∆k+1(δ−r¯σ)+
r¯
2
σ
2
2 .
(15)
For the case involving the tail segment Bm,
e−∆m(δ+r¯σ)−
r¯
2
σ
2
2 ≤
Prob[θ ∈ Bm−1|s]
Prob[θ ∈ Bm|s]
≤1.168e−∆m(δ−r¯σ)+
r¯
2
σ
2
2 .
(16)
It is worth mentioning that mk+1 defined in the above
lemma is quite close to the midpoint of ck and ck+1. In fact,
it follows from Lemma 4 that |mk+1 − ck+ck+12 | <
∆k+1
64 .
We can now characterize the best response of the follower
aF (s) to the leader’s strategy aL(θ) ∈ AmL (rL, σ) up to the
first order.
Lemma 7: Let s = mk+1 + δ, with ck ≤ s ≤ ck+1. Then
aF (s) ≥ ck +
∆k+1
1 + 1.168e−∆k+1(δ−r¯σ)+
r¯2σ2
2
− 1.01r¯σ
aF (s) ≤ ck +
∆k+1
1 + e−∆k+1(δ+r¯σ)−
r¯2σ2
2
+ 1.01r¯σ. (17)
Also,
0≤
d
ds
aF (s)≤1.17e
−∆k+1(|δ|−r¯σ)(∆k+1+2r¯σ)
2+1.01r¯2σ2.
(18)
Corollary 1: A useful consequence of Lemma 7 is that
aF (s) ≥ ck+1 − 1.17e
−∆k+1(δ−r¯σ)∆k+1 − 1.01r¯σ
aF (s) ≤ ck + 1.17e
∆k+1(δ+r¯σ)∆k+1 + 1.01r¯σ, (19)
where s = mk+1 + δ, with ck ≤ s ≤ ck+1.
Note that the exponential terms in the above bounds vanish
quite fast for large C and |δ|. for small |δ|, another useful
upper bound on the derivative of aF (s) is
d
ds
aF (s) ≤
1
4
(∆k+1 + 2r¯σ)
2 + 1.01r¯2σ2. (20)
Corollary 2: Let s = mk+1 + δ, with ck ≤ s ≤ ck+1.
Then,
ck − 1.5r¯σ ≤ aF (s) ≤ck + 1.5r¯σ for δ < −0.65
ck+1 − 1.5r¯σ ≤ aF (s) ≤ck+1 + 1.5r¯σ for δ > 0.65.
(21)
Roughly speaking, the above corollary says that, if the
observed signal by the follower is far enough from the mid-
point of ck and ck+1, then the optimal action of the follower
is well-concentrated around ck or ck+1 (whichever that is
closer), and changes very slowly according to Lemma 7.
However, aF (s) may have very high variations for s close
to mk+1 as can be seen from Lemma 7.
The following lemma characterizes aF (s) when follower
makes a tail observation.
Lemma 8: Let s = cm + δ, where δ > 0. Then,
i) for δ ≤ σ, cm − 1.01r¯σ ≤ aF (s) ≤ cm + r¯σ, and 0 ≤
d
ds
aF (s) ≤ 0.65r¯
2σ2.
ii) for δ > σ, cm − 1.01r¯σ ≤ aF (s) ≤ cm + 5rLσ(δ + 1 +
0.01
σ2
), and 0 ≤ d
ds
aF (s) ≤ 9r
2
Lσ
2δ2.
Lemma 7 and 8 provide the first order characteristics of the
best response of the follower to a leader’s strategy aL(θ) ∈
AmL (rL, σ). We are now ready to analyze the leader’s best
response a˜L(θ) to aF (s) and see if it stays in AmL (rL, σ).
We have a˜L(θ) = argmaxaL u˜L(θ, aL), where
u˜L(θ, aL) =− rL(θ − aL)
2
− (1− rL)
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− aL)
2φ(s− aL)ds.
(22)
Lemma 9: Consider θ ∈ [ck, ck+1], 0 ≤ k < m. Then,
there exists a unique b˜k+1 ∈ [ck, ck+1] such that
|a˜L(θ) − ck| < 5r¯σ for θ < b˜k+1,
|a˜L(θ) − ck+1| < 5r¯σ for θ ≥ b˜k+1. (23)
The points b˜k+1 determine the segments of the best
response strategy a˜L(θ). We can bound the derivative of
a˜L(θ) over these segments by incorporating Lemma 7 and
Corollary 1 and 2 into the above bound.
Lemma 10: Consider θ ∈ [ck, ck+1], 0 ≤ k < m, with
θ 6= b˜k+1. Then,
d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≥
rL
rL + (1− rL)(1 + 0.3r¯2σ2)
d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≤
rL
rL + (1− rL)(1 − 2.4r¯2σ2)
. (24)
Using this lemma and the values
¯
r = rL(1 − 0.5r
2
Lσ
2)
and r¯ = rL(1 + 2.5r2Lσ2), we can easily verify that ¯r ≤d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≤ r¯. This means that Property 2 is preserved by
the best response for θ ∈ [−cm, cm]. We study the tail case
later in Lemma 12. Next, we characterize the fixed points of
the best response strategy a˜L(θ).
Lemma 11: Define
J˜L(aL) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(aF (s)− aL)
2φ(s− aL)ds. (25)
Then, J˜L(aL) is strongly convex over [ck − 5r¯σ, ck + 5r¯σ],
with d
2
da2
L
J˜L(aL) ≥ 2(1 − 2.4r¯
2σ2). Let c˜k be the unique
solution of
c˜k = argmin
aL∈[ck−5r¯σ,ck+5r¯σ]
J˜L(aL). (26)
Then, a˜L(c˜k) = c˜k.
The above lemma implies that Property 1 is also preserved
under the best response. Next lemma describes the tail
properties of a˜L(θ).
Lemma 12: If b˜m < θ < c˜m+σ2, then
¯
r ≤ d
dθ
a˜L(θ) ≤ r¯.
For θ > c˜m + σ2, we have
a˜L(θ) ≤ c˜m + 5rL(θ + σ − c˜m). (27)
Now, in order to verify that the updated strategy a˜L(θ)
satisfies Property 3, we need to bound the displacements in
the fixed points c˜k and endpoints b˜k.
Lemma 13: For the endpoints of the intervals correspond-
ing to a˜L(θ), we have
|b˜k+1 −
c˜k + c˜k+1
2
| ≤ 0.1rLσ. (28)
Bounding the displacement in c˜k has multiple steps: it
involves relating the fixed point of the leader’s best response
a˜L(θ) in interval B˜k to the fixed point of aF (s) in Bk
(i.e., sk), followed by estimating sk in terms of ck and ek
(recall that ek = EN(0,σ2)[θ|θ ∈ Bk], i.e., the expected value
of θ over Bk). Finally we bound the displacement in ek
with the displacement of the interval endpoints using several
properties of truncated normal distribution.
Lemma 14: Let sk be the fixed point of aF (s) in the
interval [ck − 5r¯σ, ck + 5r¯σ], i.e., aF (sk) = sk. Then,
|c˜k − sk| < 0.44r
2
Lσ
2. (29)
Lemma 15: sk can be located based on ck and ek as
|sk − (1− rL)ck − rLek| < (2m+ 3.3)r
2
Lσ. (30)
Using Lemma 14 and 15, we can reach at
|c˜k−(1−rL)ck−rLek| < 0.44r
2
Lσ
2+(2m+3.3)r2Lσ. (31)
We can now use (31) and Lemma 13 to verify that Property 3
is also preserved by the best response, completing the proof
of the invariance of AmL (rL, σ) for σ ≥ σm given by
Lemma 1.
Theorem 2: Consider the regime 1
σ
≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1 and a
given m ∈ N. Then, there exists σm > 0 such that for any
σ ≥ σm, the set of (2m+1)-segmented strategies AmL (rL, σ)
for the leader, characterized by Property 1-3, is invariant
under the best response. Moreover, the game described in
Section II has an equilibrium for which a∗L(θ, rL, σ) ∈
AmL (rL, σ).
Given m ∈ N, the maximum deviation of fixed points
ck from their counterparts c0k for strategies in AmL (rL, σ) is
upper-bounded by 2m2(0.44rLσ2+(2m+3.4)rLσ), accord-
ing to (6). This upper bound does not grow unboundedly
with σ in the regime 1
σ
≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1. Furthermore, if
σ → +∞ along a path where rLσ2 → 0, this upper
bound approaches zero, hence asymptotically identifying the
equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1: Let a0L(θ, rL, σ) be the (2m+1)-segmented
piecewise-linear strategy with B0k’s as segments and c0k’s
as fixed points and fixed common slope rL, that is,
a0L(θ, rL, σ) = c
0
k + rL(θ − c
0
k) for θ ∈ B0k. Then,
lim
rLσ
2
→0
σ→+∞
EN(0,σ2)[|a
∗
L(θ, rL, σ)− a
0
L(θ, rL, σ)|]→ 0. (32)
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In [1], Witsenhausen proves the existence of a nonlinear
controller which outperforms the optimal linear strategy for
a simple two-stage LQG decentralized control problem. The
equivalent regime under our setup is k2σ2 = 1, where
k2 = rL1−rL . Witsenhausen shows that for large enough values
of σ the optimal controller in this regime is nonlinear. It has
been a long-standing conjecture that the optimal controller
is a near piecewise-linear controller ( [14]). Theorem 2
proves the existence of an equilibrium for the game of
Section II with a near piecewise-linear strategy for the leader
for sufficiently large σ in the regime 1
σ
≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1; This
implies the existence of a slopey quantized local optimum
3 for Witsenhausen’s counterexample in this regime (it is
easy to verify that k2σ2 = 1 falls in this regime, since
k2σ2 = 1 yields 1
σ
< rLσ
2 = 1 − rL < 1 for σ > 2).
The aim of this section is to illustrate Theorem 2 for the
special cases of m = 1, 2 by specifying explicit values for
σm which guarantee the existence of 3-segmented and 5-
segmented near piecewise-linear equilibria, respectively.
Proposition 2 (3-Segmented Equilibria): Suppose that
1
σ
≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1 and σ ≥ 16. Then, the game described in
Section II has an equilibrium with a∗L(θ, rL, σ) ∈ A1L(rL, σ);
a∗L(θ, rL, σ) is a 3-segmented near piecewise-linear strategy
possessing Property 1-3.
The strip containing this nonlinear strategy for the leader
for the case σ = 16 and rLσ2 = 1−rL is depicted in Figure 1
(the plot only shows the region θ ≥ 0; aL(−θ) = −aL(θ)).
3This is indeed stronger than a local optimum since, at an equilibrium,
fixing one player’s strategy the deviation in the other player’s strategy does
not have to be local.
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Fig. 1. The strip containing the nonlinear equilibrium strategy for the
leader for the case σ = 16 and rLσ2 = 1− rL.
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Fig. 2. The strip containing the nonlinear equilibrium strategy for the
leader for the case σ = 60 and rLσ2 = 1− rL.
Proposition 3 (5-Segmented Equilibria): Suppose that
1
σ
≤ rLσ
2 ≤ 1 and σ ≥ 60.4 Then, the game described in
Section II has an equilibrium with a∗L(θ, rL, σ) ∈ A2L(rL, σ);
a∗L(θ, rL, σ) is a 5-segmented near piecewise-linear strategy
possessing Property 1-3.
The strip containing this nonlinear strategy for the leader
for the case σ = 60 and rLσ2 = 1 − rL is depicted in
Figure 2. V. CONCLUSIONS
We studied Witsenhausen’s counterexample in a leader-
follower game setup where the follower makes noisy obser-
vations from the leader’s action and aims to choose her action
as close as possible to that of the leader. Leader who moves
first and can see the realization of the state of the world
chooses her action to minimize her ex-ante distance from
the follower’s action as well as the state of the world. We
showed the existence of nonlinear perfect Bayesian equilibria
in the regime where there is strong complementarity between
4It is to be noted that smaller values for σm may work here (and similarly
in Proposition 2). These values are obtained using the bounds derived for
generic m. Of course, given a specific value of m, these bounds can be
tightened much further which may result in smaller values for σm.
the leader and the follower when the prior has very poor
precision. Our results provide the first analytical proof for
the local optimality of near piecewise-linear controllers for
the well-known Witsenhausen’s counterexample, where the
optimal controller is conjectured to be a slopey quantizer.
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